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ON ZERO-SUM OPTIMAL STOPPING GAMES
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR AND ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. On a filtered probability space (Ω,F , P, F = (Ft)t=0,... ,T ), we consider stopping games
V := infρ∈Tii supτ∈T E[U(ρ(τ ), τ )] and V := supτ∈Ti infρ∈T E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))] in discrete time, where
U(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable instead of Fs∧t-measurable as is assumed in the literature on Dynkin
games, T is the set of stopping times, and Ti and Tii are sets of mappings from T to T satisfying
certain non-anticipativity conditions. We will see in an example that there is no room for stopping
strategies in classical Dynkin games unlike the new stopping game we are introducing. We convert
the problems into an alternative Dynkin game, and show that V = V = V , where V is the value of
the Dynkin game. We also get optimal ρ ∈ Tii and τ ∈ Ti for V and V respectively.
1. Introduction
On a filtered probability space (Ω,F , P,F = (Ft)t=0,... ,T ), let us consider the game
inf
ρ
sup
τ
EU(ρ, τ) and sup
τ
inf
ρ
EU(ρ, τ), (1.1)
where U(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable.
First, we consider the case in which ρ and τ in the above are stopping times. That is, let
A := inf
ρ∈T
sup
τ∈T
EU(ρ, τ) and A := sup
τ∈T
inf
ρ∈T
EU(ρ, τ), (1.2)
where T is the set of F-stopping times taking values in {0, . . . , T}. In the particular case when
U(s, t) = fs1{s<t} + gt1{s≥t} (1.3)
in which ft and gt are bounded F-adapted processes, the problem above is said to be a Dynkin
game (see for example [3] and [9, Chapter VI-6]). It is well-known that if f ≥ g then A = A.1
Note that U in (1.3) is Fs∧t-measurable, and thus Dynkin game ends at the minimum of ρ and τ .
However, for a general U , it may be possible that A > A even for some very natural choices of U .
For example, consider
U(s, t) = |s− t|. (1.4)
With this choice of U , the problem in (1.2) becomes deterministic, and it is easy to see that
A = ⌈T/2⌉ > 0 = A. As opposed to the Dynkin game in which U is given by (1.3), we can see
that the game with U given by (1.4) has not ended when only one of the players has stopped,
i.e., the payoff will be further affected by the player who stops later. Intuitively, the failure of the
equality A = A of the two game values in (1.2) is due to the fact that the minimizer in the first
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1For example, let ft = gt = t. Then U(s, t) = s ∧ t. By setting ρ ≡ 0 we can see that A = A = 0.
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2game (represented by A) is weaker than the minimizer in the second game (represented by A). The
opposite holds for the maximizer. In other words, the inner player in either of the games knows the
outer player’s prefixed strategy but not vice versa.
One could try to amend the above situation by strengthening the outer players in these two
games by giving them more choices. We will let them use strategies rather than just stopping
times (which as we shall see are the simplest possible form of strategies). That is, we consider the
stopping games
inf
ρ
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)] and sup
τ
inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))],
where ρ(·), τ (·) : T 7→ T satisfy certain non-anticipativity conditions. In fact, it is more meaningful
to state these games with using strategies for the outer players because the inner players’ actions
changes the natural filtration of the reward processes and the games are still continuing after those
actions. Hence we need to let the outer players adjust their strategies given the actions of the inner
players.
One possible definition of a class of non-anticipative stopping strategies (we denote the collection
of them as Ti) would be that, ρ ∈ Ti, if ρ : T 7→ T satisfies
either ρ(σ1) = ρ(σ2) ≤ σ1 ∧ σ2 or ρ(σ1) ∧ ρ(σ2) > σ1 ∧ σ2, ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ T .
That is, either the outer player acts first and chooses just a stopping time, or she waits and observes
the inner player and starting at the very next step makes a decision knowing the action of the inner
player. Each stopping time T ⊂ Ti can be regarded as a stopping strategy that is indifferent to all
inner stopping times.
With the above definition let us consider the game
B := inf
ρ∈Ti
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)] and B := sup
τ∈Ti
inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))]. (1.5)
Now compared to (1.2), the outer players in the above two games have more power as they have
more choices (Ti other than T ). However, even in this situation it may still be the case that
B > B, (1.6)
which shows that the outer players still do not have enough strength to make B = B. Below is an
example showing that B > B.
Example 1.1. Let T = 1 and U(s, t) = 1{s 6=t}, t = 0, 1. Then there are only two elements, ρ
0 and
ρ1, in Ti, with ρ0(0) = ρ0(1) = 0 and ρ1(0) = ρ1(1) = 1. It can be shown that B = 1 and B = 0.
Another possible definition of non-anticipative stopping strategies (we denote the collection as
T
ii) would be that, ρ ∈ Tii, if ρ : T 7→ T satisfies
either ρ(σ1) = ρ(σ2) < σ1 ∧ σ2 or ρ(σ1) ∧ ρ(σ2) ≥ σ1 ∧ σ2, ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ T . (1.7)
That is, either the outer player acts first strictly before the other player or it waits and observes
the inner player and at that very moment makes a decision knowing the action of the inner player.
3Now consider
C := inf
ρ∈Tii
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)] and C := sup
τ∈Tii
inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))]. (1.8)
Since Ti ⊂ Tii,2 the outer players here have more power compared to the case in (1.5).
It turns out that by using strategies in Tii, the outer players in (1.8) have too much power now,
in the sense that it is possible that
C < C. (1.9)
We still use Example 1.1 as an example.
Example 1.2. Let T = 1 and U(s, t) = 1{s 6=t}, t = 0, 1. Then in this case T
ii is the set of all the
maps from T to T . By letting ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(1) = 1, we have that C = 0. By Letting τ (0) = 1
and τ (1) = 0, we have that C = 1.
Observe that B = C and B = C in Examples 1.1 and 1.2. In fact it is by no means a coincidence
as we will see later in this paper. That is, we always have
V := inf
ρ∈Tii
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)] = sup
τ∈Ti
inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))] =: V . (1.10)
Using Tii for ρ (the outer player) in the first game and Ti for τ (the outer player) in the second game
above can be thought of as striking a balance between “not enough power” in (1.5) and “too much
power” in (1.8) for the outer player. An intuitive reason of V = V in (1.10) is that, at each time
period we designate the same player (here we choose “sup”) to act first (if one interprets “to stop”
and “not to stop” as the allowable set of actions). So this player (“sup”) can only take advantage
of the other’s (“inf’s”) previous behavior (as opposed to “inf” taking advantage of “sup’s” current
behavior in addition).
Remark 1.1. In the continuous-time case, we have also have (1.6) and (1.9) in general (see Remark
2.1, in [2]). But in order to solve this problem the latter paper assumes that the pay-off is right
continuous along stopping times in the sense of expectation as in [8], which is the most relaxed
assumption in the continuous optimal stopping time literature (see also [6, 7]), and a result the
difference between the two types of non-anticipativity conditions disappear, i.e. B = B and C = C.
Hence the discrete-time case is interesting, because no such technical condition is needed and one
is able to observe the structure of the problem more clearly.
Our new zero-sum stopping game, which can be considered as a two stage Dynkin game, also
captures the “game nature”— the interaction between players (i.e., players can adjust their own
strategies according to the other’s behavior). For example, unlike in A in (1.2) where ρ does not
depend on τ (but τ depends on ρ), in V , ρ depends on τ by the definition of Tii (and of course τ
still depends on ρ as τ is the inner player).
2To wit, let ρ ∈ Ti and take σ1, σ2 ∈ T . If ρ(σ1) ∧ ρ(σ2) > σ1 ∧ σ2, then (1.7) is satisfied. Now assume
ρ(σ1) = ρ(σ2) ≤ σ1 ∧ σ2. If the strict inequality holds, then the first part of (1.7) is satisfied. Otherwise, ρ(σ1) =
ρ(σ2) = σ1 ∧ σ2, which implies the second part of (1.7).
4Since [3] Dynkin games have been studied extensively, and we refer to the survey paper [5] and
the references therein. The stopping game we introduce here is more suitable for handing conflict
since in general players take turns in playing the game and the game does not end when one of the
players act. In other words, stopping games are not always duels, which is what the usual Dynkin
game models. In Section 3.2 and 3.3, we will provide two applications of our game, including a
robust utility maximization problem involving two American options, and an example of competing
companies choosing times to enter the market.
We can also relate our paper to the following interesting phenomenon observed in stochastic
differential games: In a zero-sum game with one player doing the inside optimization using an
open loop strategy and the other player doing outside optimization using an Elliott-Kalton (non-
anticipative) strategy, it has been observed (see for example [1], Theorem 3.11) that the infimum
and supremum can not be exchanged. For the game to have a value when one needs to change
the strength of the players appropriately: the outside player should have closed loop strategies
and the inside player should have open loop controls. (This was only proved analytically using a
viscosity comparison.) We are able to observe this in an optimal stopping problem for the first
time. Moreover, we prove it directly using probabilistic techniques only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the
main result. We provide three examples in Section 3. In Section 4, we give the proof of the main
result. Finally we give some insight for the corresponding problems in continuous time in Section
5.
2. The setup and the main result
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and F = (Ft)t=0,... ,T be the filtration enlarged by P -null
sets, where T ∈ N is the time horizon. Let U : {0, . . . , T} × {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ R, such that
U(s, t, ·) ∈ Fs∨t. For simplicity, we assume that U is bounded. Denote Et[·] for E[·|Ft]. We shall
often omit to write “almost surely” (when a property holds outside a P -null set). Let Tt be the set
of F-stopping times taking values in {t . . . , T}, and T := T0. We define the stopping strategies of
Type I and Type II as follows:
Definition 2.1. ρ is a stopping strategy of Type I (resp. II), if ρ : T 7→ T satisfies the “non-
anticipativity” condition of Type I (resp. II), i.e., for any σ1, σ2 ∈ T ,
either ρ(σ1) = ρ(σ2) ≤ (resp. <) σ1 ∧ σ2 or ρ(σ1) ∧ ρ(σ2) > (resp. ≥) σ1 ∧ σ2. (2.1)
Denote Ti (resp. Tii) as the set of stopping strategies of Type I (resp. II).
Remark 2.1. We can treat T as a subset of Ti and Tii (i.e., each τ ∈ T can be treated as the map
with only one value τ). Hence we have T ⊂ Ti ⊂ Tii.
Consider the problem
V := inf
ρ∈Tii
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)] and V := sup
τ∈Ti
inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ (ρ))]. (2.2)
5We shall convert this problem into a Dynkin game. In order to do so, let us introduce the following
two processes that will represent the payoffs in the Dynkin game. Let
V 1t := ess inf
ρ∈Tt
Et[U(ρ, t)], t = 0, . . . , T, (2.3)
and
V 2t := max
{
ess sup
τ∈Tt+1
Et[U(t, τ)], V
1
t
}
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (2.4)
and V 2T = U(T, T ). Observe that
V 1t ≤ V
2
t , t = 0, . . . , T. (2.5)
By the classic optimal stopping theory (see e.g., [4, Appendix D]), there exist an optimizer ρu(t) ∈
Tt for V
1
t , and an optimizer τu(t) ∈ Tt+1 for ess supτ∈Tt+1 Et[U(t, τ)], t = 0, . . . , T − 1. We let
ρu(T ) = τu(T ) = T for convenience.
Define the corresponding Dynkin game as follows:
V := inf
ρ∈T
sup
τ∈T
E
[
V 1τ 1{τ≤ρ} + V
2
ρ 1{τ>ρ}
]
= sup
τ∈T
inf
ρ∈T
E
[
V 1τ 1{τ≤ρ} + V
2
ρ 1{τ>ρ}
]
,
where the second equality above follows from (2.5). Moreover, there exists a saddle point (ρd, τd)
(see e.g., [5]) described by
ρd := inf{s ≥ 0 : Vs = V
2
s } and τd := inf{s ≥ 0 : Vs = V
1
s }, (2.6)
where
Vt := ess inf
ρ∈Tt
ess sup
τ∈Tt
Et
[
V 1τ 1{τ≤ρ} + V
2
ρ 1{τ>ρ}
]
= ess sup
τ∈Tt
ess inf
ρ∈Tt
Et
[
V 1τ 1{τ≤ρ} + V
2
ρ 1{τ>ρ}
]
.
That is,
V = sup
τ∈T
E
[
V 1τ 1{τ≤ρd} + V
2
ρd
1{τ>ρd}
]
= inf
ρ∈T
E
[
V 1τd1{τd≤ρ} + V
2
ρ 1{τd>ρ}
]
.
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.1. We have that
V = V = V.
Besides, there exists ρ∗ ∈ Tii and τ∗ : Tii 7→ T described by
ρ∗(τ) = ρd1{τ>ρd} + ρu(τ)1{τ≤ρd}, τ ∈ T , (2.7)
and
τ∗(ρ) := τd1{τd≤ρ(τd)} + τu(ρ(τd))1{τd>ρ(τd)}, ρ ∈ T
ii, (2.8)
such that
V = sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ∗(τ), τ)] = inf
ρ∈Tii
E[U(ρ(τ∗(ρ)), τ∗(ρ))].
Similarly, there exists τ ∗∗ ∈ Ti and ρ∗∗ : Ti 7→ T described by
τ ∗∗(ρ) = τd1{ρ≥τd} + τu(ρ)1{ρ<τd}, ρ ∈ T , (2.9)
and
ρ∗∗(τ ) := ρd1{ρd<τ (ρd)} + ρu(τ (ρd))1{ρd≥τ (ρd)}, τ ∈ T
i,
6such that
V = inf
ρ∈T
E[U(ρ,τ ∗∗(ρ))] = sup
τ∈Ti
E[U(ρ∗∗(τ ), τ (ρ∗∗(τ )))].
Remark 2.2. As the inner player in V , τ depends on ρ. Therefore, as a good reaction to ρ, τ∗(·)
defined in (2.8) is a map from Tii to T instead of a stopping time. (To convince oneself, one may
think of infx supy f(x, y) = infx f(x, y
∗(x)).)
Corollary 2.1.
V = E[U(ρ∗(τ∗(ρ∗)), τ∗(ρ∗))].
Moreover,
ρ∗(τ∗(ρ∗)) = ρd1{τd>ρd} + ρu(τd)1{τd≤ρd} and τ
∗(ρ∗) = τd1{τd≤ρd} + τu(ρd)1{τd>ρd}. (2.10)
Similar results hold for V .
Proof. By (2.7),
ρ∗(τd) = ρd1{τd>ρd} + ρu(τd)1{τd≤ρd}.
If τd > ρd, then ρ
∗(τd) = ρd < τd, which implies that {τd > ρd} ⊂ {τd > ρ
∗(τd)}. If τd ≤ ρd, then
ρ∗(τd) = ρu(τd) ≥ τd, which implies that {τd ≤ ρd} ⊂ {τd ≤ ρ
∗(τd)}. Therefore, {τd > ρd} = {τd >
ρ∗(τd)} and {τd ≤ ρd} = {τd ≤ ρ
∗(τd)}. Hence we have that
τ∗(ρ∗) = τd1{τd≤ρd} + τu(ρ
∗(τd))1{τd>ρd} = τd1{τd≤ρd} + τu(ρd)1{τd>ρd},
where the second equality follows from that ρ∗(τd) = ρd on {τd > ρd}.
Now if τd ≤ ρd, then τ
∗(ρ∗) = τd ≤ ρd, and thus {τd ≤ ρd} ⊂ {τ
∗(ρ∗) ≤ ρd}. If τd > ρd, then
τ∗(ρ∗) = τu(ρd) > ρd since τu(t) ≥ t+ 1 if t < T , and thus {τd > ρd} ⊂ {τ
∗(ρ∗) > ρd}. Therefore,
{τd ≤ ρd} = {τ
∗(ρ∗) ≤ ρd} and {τd > ρd} = {τ
∗(ρ∗) > ρd}. Hence we have that
ρ∗(τ∗(ρ∗)) = ρd1{τd>ρd} + ρu(τ
∗(ρ∗))1{τd≤ρd} = ρd1{τd>ρd} + ρu(τd)1{τd≤ρd},
where the second equality follows from that τ∗(ρ∗) = τd on {τd ≤ ρd}. 
3. Examples
In this section we provide three examples that fall within the setup of Section 2. The first
example shows that in the classical Dynkin game one does not need to use non-anticipative stopping
strategies. The second example is a relevant problem from mathematical finance in which our results
can be applied. This problem is on determining the optimal exercise strategy when one trades two
different American options in different directions. In the third example we consider two competing
companies making an entry decision into a particular market.
73.1. Dynkin game using non-anticipative stopping strategies. Let
U(s, t) = fs1{s<t} + gt1{s≥t},
where (ft)t and (gt)t are F-adapted, satisfying f ≥ g. Then we have that
V 1t = gt, t = 0, . . . , T, and V
2
t = ft, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Then by Theorem 2.1 we have that
inf
ρ∈Tii
sup
τ∈T
E
[
fρ(τ)1{ρ(τ)<τ} + gτ1{ρ(τ)≥τ}
]
= sup
τ∈Ti
inf
ρ∈T
E
[
fρ1{ρ<τ (ρ)} + gτ (ρ)1{ρ≥τ (ρ)}
]
= sup
τ∈T
inf
ρ∈T
E
[
fρ1{ρ<τ} + gτ1{ρ≥τ}
]
= inf
ρ∈T
sup
τ∈T
E
[
fρ1{ρ<τ} + gτ1{ρ≥τ}
]
.
Besides, by the property of U , the ρ∗ and τ ∗∗ defined in (2.7) and (2.9) can w.l.o.g. be written as
ρ = ρd and τ = τd.
Therefore, in the Dynkin game, using non-anticipative stopping strategies is the same as using a
usual stopping time.
Remark 3.1. In this example we let ρ ∈ Tii and τ ∈ Ti. The same conclusion holds if we let
ρ ∈ Ti and τ ∈ Tii instead.
3.2. A robust utility maximization problem. Let
U(t, s) = U(ft − gs),
where U : R 7→ R is a utility function, and f and g are adapted to F. Consider
V := sup
ρ∈Tii
inf
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ)].
This problem can be interpreted as the one in which an investor longs an American option f and
shorts an American option g, and the goal is to choose an optimal stopping strategy to maximize
the utility according to the stopping behavior of the holder of g. Here we assume that the maturities
of f and g are the same (i.e., T ). This is without loss of generality. Indeed for instance, if the
maturity of f is tˆ < T , then we can define f(t) = f(tˆ) for t = tˆ+ 1, . . . , T .
3.3. Time to enter the market. There are two companies choosing when to enter a specific
market. These two companies will produce the same kind of product. The one that enters the
market first can start collecting profit earlier, while the one that enters second can use the other’s
experience (e.g., marketing strategies, technologies) to reduce its own cost. Hence, each company’s
entering time will affect the profit and market share no matter if it enters the market first or second.
Then a natural and simple model for this set-up would be given by our game defined in (2.2).
84. Proof of Theorem 2.1
We will only prove the results for V , since the proofs for V are similar.
Lemma 4.1. For any σ ∈ T , ρu(σ) ∈ T and τu(σ) ∈ T .
Proof. Take σ ∈ T . Then for t ∈ {0, . . . , T}
{ρu(σ) ≤ t} = ∪
t
i=0({σ = i} ∩ {ρu(i) ≤ t}) ∈ Ft.

Lemma 4.2. ρ∗ defined in (2.7) is in Tii and τ∗ defined in (2.8) is a map from Tii to T .
Proof. Take τ ∈ T . We have that
{ρ∗(τ) ≤ t} = ({τ > ρd} ∩ {ρd ≤ t}) ∪ ({τ ≤ ρd} ∩ {ρu(τ) ≤ t})
= ({τ > ρd} ∩ {ρd ≤ t}) ∪ ({τ ≤ ρd} ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∩ {ρu(τ) ≤ t}) ∈ Ft.
Hence ρ∗(τ) ∈ T . Similarly we can show that τ∗(ρ) ∈ T for any ρ ∈ Tii.
It remains to show that ρ∗ satisfies the non-anticipative condition of Type II in (2.1). Take
τ1, τ2 ∈ T . If ρ
∗(τ1) < τ1 ∧ τ2 ≤ τ1, then τ1 > ρd and thus ρ
∗(τ1) = ρd < τ1 ∧ τ2 ≤ τ2, which
implies ρ∗(τ2) = ρd = ρ
∗(τ1) < τ1 ∧ τ2. If ρ
∗(τ1) ≥ τ1 ∧ τ2, then if ρ
∗(τ2) < τ1 ∧ τ2 we can use
the previous argument to get that ρ∗(τ1) = ρ
∗(τ2) < τ1 ∧ τ2 which is a contradiction, and thus
ρ∗(τ2) ≥ τ1 ∧ τ2. 
Lemma 4.3.
V ≤ sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ∗(τ), τ)] ≤ V.
Proof. Recall ρ∗ defined in (2.7) and ρd defined in (2.6). We have that
V ≤ sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ∗(τ), τ)]
= sup
τ∈T
E
[
U(ρd, τ)1{ρd<τ} + U(ρu(τ), τ)1{ρd≥τ}
]
= sup
τ∈T
E
[
1{ρd<τ}Eρd [U(ρd, τ)] + 1{ρd≥τ}Eτ [U(ρu(τ), τ)]
]
≤ sup
τ∈T
E
[
1{ρd<τ}V
2
ρd
+ 1{ρd≥τ}V
1
τ
]
= V.

Lemma 4.4.
V ≥ inf
ρ∈Tii
E[U(ρ(τ∗(ρ)), τ∗(ρ))] ≥ V.
Proof. Take ρ ∈ Tii. Recall τ∗ defined in (2.8). By the non-anticipativity condition of Type II in
(2.1),
either ρ(τ∗(ρ)) = ρ(τd) < τd ∧ τ
∗(ρ) or ρ(τ∗(ρ)) ∧ ρ(τd) ≥ τd ∧ τ
∗(ρ).
9Therefore,
if ρ(τd) ≥ τd, then ρ(τ
∗(ρ)) ≥ τd ∧ τ
∗(ρ) = τd = τ
∗(ρ),
and
if ρ(τd) < τd, then τ
∗(ρ) = τu(ρ(τd)) > ρ(τd) =⇒ ρ(τd) < τ
∗(ρ) ∧ τd (4.1)
=⇒ ρ(τd) = ρ(τ
∗(ρ)),
where in (4.1) we used the fact that τu(t) ≥ t+ 1 if t < T (in the first conclusion).
Besides, if τd > ρ(τd), then by the fact that V
1 ≤ V and (2.6) we have that
V 1ρ(τd) < Vρ(τd) ≤ V
2
ρ(τd)
,
which implies that
V 2ρ(τd) = ess sup
τ∈Tρ(τd)+1
Eρ(τd)[U(ρ(τd), τ)] = Eρ(τd)[U(ρ(τd), τu(ρ(τd)))].
Now we have that
sup
τ∈T
E[U(ρ(τ), τ))] ≥ E[U(ρ(τ∗(ρ)), τ∗(ρ))]
= E
[
U(ρ(τ∗(ρ)), τ∗(ρ))1{τd≤ρ(τd)} + U(ρ(τ
∗(ρ)), τ∗(ρ))1{τd>ρ(τd)}
]
= E
[
U(ρ(τ∗(ρ)), τd)1{τd≤ρ(τd)} + U(ρ(τd), τu(ρ(τd)))1{τd>ρ(τd)}
]
= E
[
1{τd≤ρ(τd)}Eτd [U(ρ(τ
∗(ρ)), τd)] + 1{τd>ρ(τd)}Eρ(τd)[U(ρ(τd), τu(ρ(τd)))]
]
≥ E
[
1{τd≤ρ(τd)}V
1
τd
+ 1{τd>ρ(τd)}V
2
ρ(τd)
]
≥ inf
ρ∈T
E
[
1{τd≤ρ}V
1
τd
+ 1{τd>ρ}V
2
ρ
]
= V,
where the fifth inequality follows from the definition of V 1 in (2.3) and the fact that ρ(τ∗(ρ)) ≥ τd
on {ρ(τd) ≥ τd}. As this holds for arbitrary ρ ∈ T
ii, the conclusion follows. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. This follows from Lemmas 4.1-4.4. 
5. Some insight into the continuous-time version
We can also consider the continuous time version of the stopper-stopper problem. If we want to
follow the argument in Section 4, there are mainly two technical parts we need to handle as opposed
to the discrete-time case, which are as follows.
• We need to make sure that V 1 and V 2 defined in (2.3) and (2.4) have RCLL modifications.
• On an intuitive level, the optimizers (or choose to be ǫ-optimizers in continuous time) ρu(·)
and τu(·) are maps from T to T . Yet this may not be easy to prove in continuous time, as
opposed to the argument in Lemma 4.2.
In order to address the two points above, we may have to assume some continuity of U in (s, t)
(maybe also in ω). On the other hand, with such continuity, there will essentially be no difference
between using stopping strategies of Type I and using stopping strategies of Type II, as opposed
to the discrete-time case (see Examples 1.1 and 1.2).
10
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